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On the Definition and Nature of Fiscal Coercion

George Tridimas () and Stanley Winer ()
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George Tridimas: Ulster University Business School,

No 18-09, Carleton Economic Papers from Carleton University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We introduce ideas about how coercion in public finance can be formally defined, building on recent work in the literature. Our discussion illustrates the connection between selected aspects of this research and earlier seminal work on coercion by Wicksell, Lindahl, and Buchanan and Tullock. We also attempt to contribute modestly towards a fuller understanding of the nature of coercion in a public finance setting. We use a Lindahl solution as the counterfactual social state relative to which coercion inherent in any situation is to be judged in order to evaluate and compare the nature of coercion imposed by a social planner and in an electoral equilibrium.

Keywords: coercion, fiscal coercion; calculus of consent; individual-as-dictator; individual-insociety; individual-as-planner; correlations of income, tastes and political influence; Lindahl solution; electoral equilibrium; optimal taxation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-07-12
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Published: Carleton Economic Papers

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Handle: RePEc:car:carecp:18-09