On the Structure of the Political Party System in Indian States, 1957 - 2013
J. Stephen Ferris () and
Bharatee Dash ()
No 20-06, Carleton Economic Papers from Carleton University, Department of Economics
What accounts for the large and ever-changing number of political parties that contest Indian state elections? In this paper we examine this question by testing an equilibrium model of political party numbers where the number of parties depend on the average size of state constituencies, voter turnout, the heterogeneity of the stateâ€™s electorate, constitutional and legislative rules that directly affect party numbers and per capita state incomes while controlling for a series of discrete political events that have influenced political parties. The analysis compares this model with one explaining the effective number of parties (ENP) and extends the analysis to consider the effect of political factors such as the openness and competitiveness of the upcoming election on the timing of the decision of political parties to enter and exit (and thus the rate of political party turnover). The analysis is further extended by allowing the level of development to interact with their party structures.
Keywords: number of political parties; Indian states; entry and exit of political partie; ENP; fixed effects poisson panel estimation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 P16 H70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-ore and nep-pol
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Published: Carleton Economics Papers
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:car:carecp:20-06
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