The Efficiency Case of Universality

Nicholas Rowe and Frances Woolley

Carleton Economic Papers from Carleton University, Department of Economics

Abstract: The paper analyzes the replacement of universal social programs with targeted social benefits. We define "universality" as separability of tax/transfer system in income and other non-monetary attributes, and introduce the concept of "parallel equity" - a requirement that like differences in needs should be treated alike. We develop a model which shows that under specificed assumptions universality is efficient as well as equitable; "clawback" results in an inefficient structure of net marginal tax rate.

Keywords: SOCIAL PROGRAMS; SOCIAL WELFARE; TAX POLICY; UNIVERSALITY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H51 H53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 1996-08, Revised 1999-05
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published: – revised version in Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 32, No. 3 (May 1999), pp. 613–629

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Journal Article: The Efficiency Case for Universality (1999)
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