Selective Versus Universal Vouchers: Modelling Median Voter Preferences in Education

Zhiqi Chen and Edwin G. West
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Edwin G. West: Department of Economics, Carleton University

No 98-02, Carleton Economic Papers from Carleton University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Under the majority voting rule, a system of universally available vouchers (UV) is politically less feasible than a system of selective vouchers (SV) confined to families with incomes equal to or less than median voter income. After the introduction of UV, public expenditure on education will have to be shared with previous private school users. Per capita expenditure will then drop and/or tax will increase. Since these events will injure the median voter, he will reject UV. He will be indifferent between the status quo and SV. Indifference will turn into enthusiasm however, if, as can be expected, the new regime (SV) brings effective new competition.

Keywords: Public education; vouchers; median voter models. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H40 I28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 1998-03, Revised 2000-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (29)

Published: – revised version in American Economic Review, Vol. 90, No. 5, (December 2000), pp. 1520–1534

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