Dispute Resolution and Self-Selection in the Public Service

Stanley Winer ()

Carleton Industrial Organization Research Unit (CIORU) from Carleton University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Unions in the public service of the Government of Canada may choose unilaterally whether an impasse in bargaining will be resolved by a strike or by arbitration. This paper empirically models the union's choice of bargaining route together with wage determination under each route. Allowance is made for selectivity bias using the Heckman-Lee procedure. The results indicate that unions choosing the arbitration option would not strike, though they would have modestly increased their wages. The governments' use of essential employee designation in response to the increase in the use of the strike route option is also discussed.

Pages: 17 pages
Date: 1987
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:car:ciorup:87-03

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