Theorizing Corporate Governance: New Organizational Alternatives

Simon Learmount

Working Papers from Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge

Abstract: This paper contrasts 'economic' and 'organizational' approaches to corporate governance, in order to draw out some of their distinctive features and discuss their relative strengths and weaknesses. Some promising areas of new research are identified which examine the role of social controls and trust for the way that companies are governed. Although these are fairly embryonic, it is argued that they call into question the hegemony of economic theories in theorizing the governance of the corporation. The paper concludes by advocating a re-consideration and broadening of the current conceptual scope of corporate governance, so as to facilitate and encourage other potentially valuable ways of exploring and understanding how companies are governed.

Keywords: Corporate Governance; Social Controls (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B20 D23 G30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pke
Note: PRO-2
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cbr:cbrwps:wp237

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