A Critique of Wolak’s Evaluation of the NZ Electricity Market: The Incentive to Exercise Market Power with Elastic Demand and Transmission Loss

Seamus Hogan and Peter Jackson

Working Papers in Economics from University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance

Abstract: This paper is the second in a symposium of papers that examine the 2009 report by Frank Wolak into the New Zealand electricity market. In this paper, we discuss the Report’s measures of the ability and incentives of generators to exercise unilateral market power. We show that the construction and interpretation of these measures are highly sensitive to some key assumptions, particularly those concerning the elasticity of demand for electricity in the wholesale market and the amount of transmission loss on the national grid.

Keywords: Wolak Report; electricity markets; market power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2011-01-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene and nep-ind
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://repec.canterbury.ac.nz/cbt/econwp/1109.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: A critique of Wolak's evaluation of the NZ electricity market: The incentive to exercise market power with elastic demand and transmission loss (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cbt:econwp:11/09

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