Transaction Costs, the Opportunity Cost of Time and Procrastination in Charitable Giving

Stephen Knowles () and Maroš Servátka

Working Papers in Economics from University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance

Abstract: We conduct a laboratory experiment to study whether giving people more time to donate to charity reduces donations. People may intend to donate, but because of the transaction costs of doing so, postpone making the payment until they are less busy, and having postponed making the donation once, keep postponing. We conjecture that transaction costs will have a greater effect on donations if the solicitation is received when the opportunity cost of time is high. We find evidence of a transaction cost reducing donations, with the size of this effect depending on the opportunity cost of time, but no statistically significant evidence that giving people more time to donate increases procrastination and thus reduces donations.

Keywords: charitable giving; dictator game; transaction costs; opportunity cost of time; procrastination, inattention (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 2015-01-21
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)

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Journal Article: Transaction costs, the opportunity cost of time and procrastination in charitable giving (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cbt:econwp:15/01

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