Deadlines, Procrastination, and Inattention in Charitable Giving: A Field Experiment

Stephen Knowles (), Maroš Servátka and Trudy Sullivan

Working Papers in Economics from University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance

Abstract: We conduct a field experiment to analyze the effect of deadline length on charitable giving. Subjects are invited to complete an online survey, with a donation going to charity if they do so. Participants are given either one week, one month or no deadline by which to respond. Donations are lower for the one month deadline, than for the other two treatments, consistent with the model of inattention developed in Taubinsky (2014) and also with the idea that not specifying a deadline conveys urgency.

Keywords: Funding for this project was provided by the Department of Economics; Otago Business School; University of Otago (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2015-03-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://repec.canterbury.ac.nz/cbt/econwp/1506.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Deadlines, Procrastination, and Inattention in Charitable Giving: A Field Experiment (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cbt:econwp:15/06

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