Public implementation of Blockchain Technology

Dean Franklet, Laura Meriluoto, George Ross, Cameron Scott and Patrick Williams

Working Papers in Economics from University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance

Abstract: This paper discusses the avenues through which a public implementation of blockchain could deliver efficiency gains in the running of a government. We discuss some of the current inefficiencies in recordkeeping and the efficiency improvements that could come about if recordkeeping, including keeping track of tax liability, would be “put on the blockchain”. We discuss some of the current issues with transaction costs and property rights that governments face and how these could be addressed with blockchain. We also discuss issues with asymmetric information in general and moral hazard in particular that are ripe in the delivery of public services and how blockchain could be used to reduce them to achieve efficiency gains and better outcomes for public policy.

Keywords: Blockchain; government; recordkeeping; transaction costs; asymmetric information; principle-agent problem; moral hazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 D8 H2 H5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2018-11-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pay
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://repec.canterbury.ac.nz/cbt/econwp/1823.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cbt:econwp:18/23

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers in Economics from University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance Private Bag 4800, Christchurch, New Zealand. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Albert Yee ().