Bargaining Theory and the Copyright Royalty Board’s Rate Setting Mandate for Interactive Streaming of Music

Elliott Hughes and Richard Watt ()
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Richard Watt: University of Canterbury, https://www.canterbury.ac.nz

Working Papers in Economics from University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance

Abstract: In the USA, the remuneration for songwriters whose copyrighted material is broadcast using online interactive music services is subject to a compulsory license with a rate that is regulated by the Copyright Royalty Board (CRB). On the other hand, an essentially equally necessary input to the interactive music services, namely the sound recording copyright, is fully and freely negotiated between the parties. This situation sets up an interesting bargaining problem that should be of great interest to the CRB for their statutory mandate. The present paper sets out this problem formally, and resolves the equilibrium outcomes. The model is calibrated with the actual rates that have been set recently by the CRB.

Keywords: Bargaining theory; regulation of copyright remuneration; Copyright Royalty Board USA (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D D04 D45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2023-05-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cul and nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cbt:econwp:23/04

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