What Is the Objective of Professional Licensing? Identification of a Static Model of Licensing and Some Evidence from the US Market for Lawyers

Mario Pagliero

No 106, Carlo Alberto Notebooks from Collegio Carlo Alberto

Abstract: According to public interest theory, professional licensing solves the lemon problem generated by asymmetric information. In contrast, capture theory claims that licensing aims at increasing professional salaries by restricting supply. This paper shows that the two theories can be identified using data from one regulated profession and provides an empirical application to the US market for lawyers. The results imply that lawyers' salaries have a large weight relative to social welfare in the objective function of licensing boards.

Keywords: professional licensing; legal market; bar exam (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K2 L4 L5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2009
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ipr and nep-pr~
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cca:wpaper:106

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