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Cores of Non-Atomic Market Games

Massimiliano Amarante, Fabio Maccheroni, Massimo Marinacci and Luigi Montrucchio

No 13, Carlo Alberto Notebooks from Collegio Carlo Alberto

Abstract: We study the cores of non-atomic market games, a class of transferable utility co- operative games introduced by Aumann and Shapley [2], and, more in general, of those games that admit a na-continuous and concave extension to the set of ideal coalitions, studied by Einy, Moreno, and Shitovitz [9]. We show that the core of such games is norm compact and some related results. We also give a Multiple Priors interpretation of some of our .ndings.

Keywords: Cores; TU Games; Market Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2006
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Forthcoming in International Journal of Game Theory

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