Cores of Non-Atomic Market Games
Massimo Marinacci and
No 13, Carlo Alberto Notebooks from Collegio Carlo Alberto
We study the cores of non-atomic market games, a class of transferable utility co- operative games introduced by Aumann and Shapley , and, more in general, of those games that admit a na-continuous and concave extension to the set of ideal coalitions, studied by Einy, Moreno, and Shitovitz . We show that the core of such games is norm compact and some related results. We also give a Multiple Priors interpretation of some of our .ndings.
Keywords: Cores; TU Games; Market Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4) Track citations by RSS feed
Forthcoming in International Journal of Game Theory
Downloads: (external link)
Journal Article: Cores of non-atomic market games (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cca:wpaper:13
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Carlo Alberto Notebooks from Collegio Carlo Alberto Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Giovanni Bert ().