Optimal Criminal Behavior and the Disutility of Jail: Theory and Evidence On Bank Robberies

Giovanni Mastrobuoni (giovanni.mastrobuoni@carloalberto.org)

No 220, Carlo Alberto Notebooks from Collegio Carlo Alberto

Abstract: Based on unique data on individual bank robberies perpetrated in Italy between 2005 and 2007, this paper estimates the distribution of criminals' disutility of jail. The identification rests on the money versus risk trade-off criminals face when deciding whether to stay an additional minute robbing the bank. When robbers are successful in robbing a bank and the observed duration is assumed to be the optimal one, the disutility of jail represents the only unknown determinant of that optimal duration. One can thus solve for the disutility as a function of the expected marginal haul, average haul, and hazard rate of arrest.

Keywords: Crime; Deterrence; Sentence Enhancements; Bank Robberies; Value of Freedom; Disutility of Jail (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 K40 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 55 pages
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cca:wpaper:220

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