Application Costs in Sequential Admission Mechanisms

Matteo Triossi

No 23, Carlo Alberto Notebooks from Collegio Carlo Alberto

Abstract: This paper considers a realistic family of admission mechanisms, with multiple applications and application costs. Multiple applications impose serious coordination problems to colleges, but application costs restore stability. Without application costs and under incomplete information unstable allocations emerge.

Keywords: Application Costs; Matching Markets; Implementation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9 pages
Date: 2006
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cca:wpaper:23

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