On the Numerical Solution of Equilibria in Auction Models with Asymmetries within the Private-Values Paradigm

Timothy Hubbard and Harry Paarsch

No 291, Carlo Alberto Notebooks from Collegio Carlo Alberto

Abstract: We describe and compare numerical methods used to approximate equilibrium bid functions in models of auctions as games of incomplete information. In such games, private values are modelled as draws from bidder-specific type distributions and pay-your-bid rules are used to determine transactions prices. We provide a formal comparison of the performance of these numerical methods (based on speed and accuracy) and suggest ways in which they can be improved and extended as well as applied to new settings.

Keywords: first-price auctions; asymmetric auctions; private-values model; numerical solutions. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C20 D44 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 111 pages
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cca:wpaper:291

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