Assignment procedure biases in randomized policy experiments

Gani Aldashev, Georg Kirchsteiger and Alexander Sebald ()

No 292, Carlo Alberto Notebooks from Collegio Carlo Alberto

Abstract: Randomized controlled trials (RCT) have become a dominant empirical tool in applied economics. The internal validity of RCTs crucially depends on the (implicit) assumption that the procedure assigning subjects to treatment and control groups has no effect on behavior. We show theoretically that this assumption is violated when people are motivated by belief-dependent preferences and care about the intentions of others. The choice of assignment procedure influences subjects’ behavior and, consequently, the RCTs’ findings. Strikingly, even a credible and explicit randomization procedure does not guarantee an unbiased prediction of the impact of a general introduction of the policy.

Keywords: Randomized controlled trials; Policy experiments; Internal validity; Procedural concerns; Psychological game theory. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C93 D63 I38 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Assignment Procedure Biases in Randomised Policy Experiments (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cca:wpaper:292

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