Corruption, Accountability and Efficiency. An Application to Municipal Solid Waste Services

Graziano Abrate, Federico Boffa, Fabrizio Erbetta and Davide Vannoni

No 316, Carlo Alberto Notebooks from Collegio Carlo Alberto

Abstract: This paper explores the link between accountability, corruption and efficiency in the context of a career concern model where politically con- nected local monopolies are in charge of the provision of a local public service. We fi?nd that both corruption and a low degree of accountabil- ity induce managers to reduce effort levels, thereby contributing to drive down efficiency. Our predictions are tested using data on solid waste management services provided by a large sample of Italian municipalities. The results of the estimation of a stochastic cost frontier model provide robust evidence that high corruption levels and low degrees of account- ability substantially increase cost inefficiency. Finally, we show that the negative impact of corruption is weaker for municipalities ruled by left- wing parties, while the positive impact of accountability is stronger if the refuse collection service is managed by limited liability companies.

Keywords: corruption; accountability efficiency; solid waste (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D24 D72 D73 L25 Q53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: CORRUPTION, ACCOUNTABILITY AND EFFICIENCY. AN APPLICATION TO MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE SERVICES (2014)
Working Paper: Corruption, Accountability and Efficiency. An Application to Municipal Solid Waste Services (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cca:wpaper:316

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