Optimal Stealing Time
Andrea Gallice ()
No 328, Carlo Alberto Notebooks from Collegio Carlo Alberto
We study a dynamic game in which players can steal parts of a homogeneous and perfectly divisible pie from each other. The e¤ectiveness of a player?s theft is a random function which is stochastically increasing in the share of the pie the agent currently owns. We show how the incentives to preempt or to follow the rivals change with the number of players involved in the game and investigate the conditions that lead to the occurrence of symmetric or asymmetric equilibria.
Keywords: stealing; stochastic games; optimal timing; pie allocation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2013, Revised 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cca:wpaper:328
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