Rent-seeking contests with private valuations

Andrea Gallice

No 390, Carlo Alberto Notebooks from Collegio Carlo Alberto

Abstract: We study a rent-seeking contest in which players have heterogeneous and private valuations. In addition to their own type, agents only know that all valuations are drawn from an unspeciÂ…ed distribution, of which they only know the mean. We obtain a closed-form solution for agentsÂ’ optimal level of investment and subject it to comparative statics analy- sis. We also investigate the issue of entry in the game and the amount of rent dissipation that results in equilibrium. Finally, we compare our results with those that would emerge in a context of perfect information.

Keywords: rent-seeking; contests; private information; imperfect information. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cca:wpaper:390

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