Curious about the price? Consumers' behavior in price reveal auctions
Andrea Gallice () and
Giuseppe Sorrenti ()
No 432, Carlo Alberto Notebooks from Collegio Carlo Alberto
We exploit several specific features of a recent online selling mechanism, the so- called price reveal auction, to empirically investigate how consumers' behavior changes in response to an item's intrinsic characteristics and 'social attributes'. We document a significant effect of the item's brand and intended use (outdoor vs. indoor) in influencing an agent's degree of impatience and willingness to pay. We show that, while both vari- ables have some explanatory power when considered in isolation, it is their interaction that really matters. We also study the determinants of the mechanism's profitability and show how, in the context of a price reveal auction, the sale of positional goods may backfire and harm revenues.
Keywords: price reveal auction; willingness to pay; social attributes; positional goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: pages 22
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cca:wpaper:432
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