Cooperation in Social Dilemmas through Position Uncertainty
Andrea Gallice () and
Ignacio Monzon ()
No 493, Carlo Alberto Notebooks from Collegio Carlo Alberto
Abstract We propose a simple mechanism that sustains full cooperation in one-shot social dilemmas among a finite number of self-interested agents. Players sequentially decide whether to contribute to a public good. They do not know their position in the sequence, but observe the actions of some predecessors. Position uncertainty provides an incentive to contribute in order to induce potential successors to also do so. Full contribution can then emerge in equilibrium. Our mechanism also leads to full cooperation in the prisoners' dilemma.
Keywords: Social Dilemmas; Position Uncertainty; Public Goods; Voluntary Contributions; Fundraising (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: pages 27
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Journal Article: Co-operation in Social Dilemmas Through Position Uncertainty (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cca:wpaper:493
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