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Legislating during war: Conflict and politics in Colombia

Juan Morales

No 565, Carlo Alberto Notebooks from Collegio Carlo Alberto

Abstract: This paper studies how legislators and their constituents respond to political violence. To do this, I use data from Twitter and roll-call votes, and employ event study and difference-in-differences methods. Tweets from incumbent party legislators and tweets with a "hard-line" language receive higher engagement following rebel attacks. The incumbent party receives higher support in the legislature after attacks, but only when it has a hard-line military policy. The effects documented are large but tend to last less than two weeks. The empirical results are consistent with a political economy model of legislative behaviour in which events that shift median voter preferences, and the presence of rally ‘round the flag effects, elicit different politician responses depending on the policy position of the ruling party. Finally, I identify a set of potentially affected congressional votes, suggesting that these conflict-induced swings in incumbent support can have persistent policy consequences.

Keywords: civil conflict; congressional voting; legislatures; political language; social media. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 H56 O10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: pages 76
Date: 2018
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https://www.carloalberto.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/no.565.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Legislating during war: Conflict and politics in Colombia (2021) Downloads
Working Paper: Legislating during war: Conflict and politics in Colombia (2017) Downloads
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