Do Security Measures Displace Crime? Theory and Evidence from Italian Bank Robberies

Vikram Maheshri and Giovanni Mastrobuoni ()

No 579, Carlo Alberto Notebooks from Collegio Carlo Alberto

Abstract: Security measures intended to deter crime may unwittingly displace it to neighboring areas, but evidence of displacement is scarce. We exploit precise information on the timing and locations of all bank robberies and security guard hirings and firings in Italy over a 10-year period to estimate the deterrence and displacement effects of guards. We find that hiring a security guard lowers the likelihood that a bank is robbed by 35-40 percent, though over half of this reduction is immediately displaced to nearby banks that are unguarded. A simple theoretical model of displacement reveals ambiguity in policies to mitigate these spillovers. Our findings suggest that policies that restrict the use of guards in sparse, rural markets and that require the use of guards in dense, urban markets could be socially beneficial.

Keywords: deterrence; displacement; spillover; policing; bank security guards. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: pages 36
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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