Mas-Colell Bargaining Set of Large Games

Massimiliano Amarante and Luigi Montrucchio

No 63, Carlo Alberto Notebooks from Collegio Carlo Alberto

Abstract: We study the equivalence between the MB-set and the core in the general context of games with a measurable space of players. In the first part of the paper, we study the problem without imposing any restriction on the class of games we consider. In the second part, we apply our findings to specific classes of games for which we provide new equivalence results. These include non-continuous convex games, exact non-atomic market games and non-atomic non-exact games. We also introduce, and characterize, a new class of games, which we call thin games. For these, we show not only that the MB-set is equal to the core, but also that it is the unique stable set in the sense of von Neumann and Morgenstern. Finally, we study the relation between thin games, market games and convex games.

Keywords: Mas-Colell Bargaining Set; maximal excess game; core-equivalence; thin games; market games; convex games. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2007
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