Costly information acquisition. Part I: better to toss a coin?

Matteo Triossi

No 68, Carlo Alberto Notebooks from Collegio Carlo Alberto

Abstract: In a common-values election with two candidates voters receive a signal about which candidate is superior. They can acquire information that improves the precision of the signal. Electors differ in their information acquisition costs. For large electorates a non negligible fraction of voters acquires information, but the quantity of informed voters and the quality of acquired information decline so fast that information aggregation fails to obtain.

Keywords: Costly Information Acquisition; Condorcet Jury Theorem. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2008
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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