Household Time Allocation and Models of Behavior: A Theory of Sorts

Daniela Del Boca and Christopher Flinn

No 8, Carlo Alberto Notebooks from Collegio Carlo Alberto

Abstract: We make the point that a flexible specification of spousal preferences and household production technology precludes the possibility of using revealed preference data on household time allocations to determine the manner in which spouses interact. Under strong, but standard, assumptions regarding marriage market equilibria, marital sorting patterns can be used essentially as "out of sample" information that allows us to assess whether household behavior is cooperative. We use a sample of households drawn from a recent wave of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, and find some evidence supporting the view that households behave in a cooperative manner.

Keywords: Bilateral Matching; Household Time Allocation; Nash Bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D13 J12 J22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2005, Revised 2006
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Household Time Allocation and Modes of Behavior: A Theory of Sorts (2005)
Working Paper: Household Time Allocation and Modes of Behavior: A Theory of Sorts (2005)
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