Sequential Versus Simultaneous Market Delineation: The Relevant Antitrust Market for Salmon

Niels Haldrup (), Peter Møllgaard and Claus Kastberg Nielsen

No 05-2, Working Papers from Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia

Abstract: Delineation of the relevant market forms a pivotal part of most antitrust cases. The standard approach is sequential. First the product market is delineated, then the geographical market is defined. Demand and supply substitution in both the product dimension and the geographical dimension will normally be stronger than substitution in either dimension. By ignoring this one might decide first to define products narrowly and then to define the geographical extent narrowly ignoring the possibility of a diagonal substitution. These reflections are important in the empirical delineation of product and geographical markets. Using a unique data set for prices of Norweigan and Scottish salmon, we propose a methodology for simultaneous market delineation and we demonstrate that compared to a sequential approach conclusions will be reversed.

Keywords: Relevant market; econometric delineation; salmon (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C3 K21 L41 Q22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2005-03
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http://www.ccp.uea.ac.uk/publicfiles/workingpapers/CCP05-2.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: SEQUENTIAL VERSUS SIMULTANEOUS MARKET DELINEATION: THE RELEVANT ANTITRUST MARKET FOR SALMON (2008)
Working Paper: Sequential versus simultaneous market delineation: The relevant antitrust market for salmon (2005)
Working Paper: Sequential Versus Simultaneous Market Delineation: The Relevant Antitrust Market for Salmon (2005)
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