Tacit Collusion, Firm Asymmetries and Numbers: Evidence from EC Merger Cases

Stephen Davies (), Matt Olczak () and Heather Coles
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Stephen Davies: Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia

No 07-7, Working Papers from Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to identify empirically the implicit structural model, especially the roles of size asymmetries and concentration, used by the European Commission to identify mergers with coordinated effects (i.e. collective dominance). Apart from its obvious policy-relevance, the paper is designed to shed empirical light on the condition under which tacit collusion is most likely. We construct a database relating to 62 candidate mergers and find that, in the eyes of the Commission, tacit collusion in this context virtually never involves more than two firms and requires close symmetry in the market shares of the two firms.

Keywords: Tacit collusion; collective dominance; coordinated effects; European mergers; asymmetries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 2007-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-eec, nep-ind and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ccp:wpaper:wp07-07

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