Market-Share Contracts with Asymmetric Information

Adrian Majumdar () and Greg Shaffer ()
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Adrian Majumdar: Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia
Greg Shaffer: Simon School of Business, University of Rochester

No 07-17, Working Papers from Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia

Abstract: In this paper, a dominant supplier and competitive fringe supply goods to a common buyer who has private information about the state of demand. We give conditions under which market-share contracts are profitable, and we show that, in some cases, the full-information outcome can be obtained (unlike in standard screening models, where the agents earns an information rent in the high state and demand is distorted in the low state). Our results also inform the antitrust debate on bundling, fidelity rebates and all-units discounts. We provide a new motive for a dominant firm to bundle its own product with a competitively supplied product (with ambiguous consequences for welfare), and we show that the market-share contracts, which are a subset of fidelity rebates, are more profitable than all-units discounts.

Keywords: Adverse selection; screening; bundling; fidelity rebates; all-units discounts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L41 L42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2007-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ccp:wpaper:wp07-17

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