The Role of Contribution among Defendants in Private Antitrust Litigation

Morten Hviid and Andrei Medvedev

No 08-3, Working Papers from Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia

Abstract: To date the experience of the incidence of private actions for damages in antitrust cases has differed markedly across jurisdictions. The procedural rules surrounding private litigation may account for some of these differences. This paper explores the effect of rules concerning contribution among multiple defendants who are joint and severally liable for a cartel infringement. The no-contribution rule is shown to lead to higher levels of aggregate damages and more information revelation to the private plaintiff. However, the no-contribution rule also has the potential to neuter any public leniency programme, thereby possibly reducing the number of cartels detected.

Keywords: cartels; leniency; private damages (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 K42 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2008-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta and nep-law
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http://www.ccp.uea.ac.uk/publicfiles/workingpapers/CCP08-3.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The role of contribution among defendants in private antitrust litigation (2010)
Working Paper: The Role of Contribution among Defendants in Private Antitrust Litigation (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ccp:wpaper:wp08-03

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