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Comprehensive Rationalizability

Burkhard Schipper, Martin Meier and Aviad Heifetz
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Aviad Heifetz: Department of Economics, University of California Davis

No 186, Working Papers from University of California, Davis, Department of Economics

Abstract: We present a new solution concept for strategic games called comprehensive rationalizability that embodies "common cautious belief in rationality" based on a sound epistemic characterization in a universal type space. It refines rationalizability, but it neither refines nor is refined by iterated admissibility. Nevertheless, it coincides with iterated admissibility in many relevant economic applications.

Keywords: Common assumption of rationality; common belief in rationality; iterated admissibility; rationalizability; lexicographic belief systems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
Date: 2017-05-01
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