Strategic Incompatibility in ATM Markets

Christopher Knittel and Victor Stango
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Victor Stango: Department of Economics, University of California Davis

No 225, Working Papers from University of California, Davis, Department of Economics

Abstract: We test whether firms use incompatibility strategically, using data from ATM markets.High ATM fees degrade the value of competitors? deposit accounts, and can in principle serveas a mechanism for siphoning depositors away from competitors or for creating deposit accountdifferentiation. Our empirical framework can empirically distinguish surcharging motivated bythis strategic concern from surcharging that simply maximizes ATM profit considered as a standaloneoperation. The results are consistent with such behavior by large banks, but not by smallbanks. For large banks, the effect of incompatibility seems to operate through higher depositaccount fees rather than increased deposit account base

Keywords: atm; industrial (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D2 E3 L6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31
Date: 2006-11-15
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Strategic incompatibility in ATM markets (2011)
Working Paper: Strategic Incompatibility in ATM Markets (2006)
Working Paper: Strategic Incompatibility in ATM Markets (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cda:wpaper:225

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