Preference-Dependent Unawareness

Burkhard Schipper

No 269, Working Papers from University of California, Davis, Department of Economics

Abstract: Morris (1996, 1997) introduced preference-based definitions of knowledge of belief in standard state-space structures. This paper extends this preference-based approach to unawareness structures (Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper, 2006, 2008). By defining unawareness and knowledge in terms of preferences over acts in unawareness structures and showing their equivalence to the epistemic notions of unawareness and knowledge, we try to build a bridge between decision theory and epistemic logic. Unawareness of an event is behaviorally characterized as the event being null and its negation being null.

Keywords: Unawareness; awareness; knowledge; preferences; subjective expected utility theory; decision theory; null event (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 D80 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19
Date: 2011-04-06
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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