Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Part II: epistemic foundations

Giacomo Bonanno ()

No 302, Working Papers from University of California, Davis, Department of Economics

Abstract: In a companion paper we introduced a general notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium which can be applied to arbitrary extensive-form games. The essential ingredient of the proposed definition is the qualitative notion of AGM-consistency. In this paper we provide an epistemic foundation for AGM-consistency based on the AGM theory of belief revision.

Keywords: belief revision; common prior; plausibility order; perfect Bayesian equilibrium; consistency; sequential equilibrium. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25
Date: 2011-01-18
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