BRANCHING TIME LOGIC, PERFECT INFORMATION GAMES AND BACKWARD INDUCTION

Michael Magill, Giacomo Bonanno () and Kristin Van Gaasback
Additional contact information
Kristin Van Gaasback: Department of Economics, University of California Davis

No 307, Working Papers from University of California, Davis, Department of Economics

Abstract: The logical foundations of game-theoretic solution concepts have so far been developed within the confines of epistemic logic. In this paper we turn to a different branch of modal logic, namely temporal logic, and propose to view the solution of a game as a complete prediction about future play. We extend the branching time framework by adding agents and by defining the notion of prediction. We show that perfect information games are a special case of extended branching time frames and that the backward-induction solution is a prediction. We also provide a characterization of backward induction in terms of the property of internal consistency of prediction.

Pages: 26
Date: 2003-01-08
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://repec.dss.ucdavis.edu/files/72HUZQ7wtGXC4WLX9SZoNzXQ/98-13.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: BRANCHING TIME LOGIC, PERFECT INFORMATION GAMES AND BACKWARD INDUCTION
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cda:wpaper:307

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from University of California, Davis, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Letters and Science IT Services Unit ().