Kuhn's Theorem for Games of the Extensive Form with Unawareness

Ki Vin Foo and Burkhard Schipper

No 369, Working Papers from University of California, Davis, Department of Economics

Abstract: We extend Kuhn's Theorem to games of the extensive form with unawareness. We prove that if a game of the extensive form with unawareness has perfect recall, then for each mixed strategy there is an equivalent behavior strategy. We show that the converse does not hold under unawareness without restricting the evolution of the player's awareness to constant awareness along paths of play. Both directions of Kuhn's Theorem for games of the extensive form with unawareness require a condition complementary to perfect recall that rules out falsely believing in some events when the player is unaware of the actual past events.

Keywords: Perfect recall; mixed strategy; behavior strategy; unawareness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35
Date: 2025-03-04
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https://repec.dss.ucdavis.edu/files/poieoogc9pihsf9nequrpiki12lp/unawkuhn16.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Kuhn's Theorem for Games of the Extensive Form with Unawareness (2026)
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