Conditional Dominance in Games with Unawareness

Burkhard C. Schipper
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Burkhard C. Schipper: Department of Economics, University of California Davis

No 380, Working Papers from University of California, Davis, Department of Economics

Abstract: Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2013) introduced dynamic games with unawareness consisting of a partially ordered set of games in extensive form. Here, we study the normal form of dynamic games with unawareness. The generalized normal form associated with a dynamic game with unawareness consists of a partially ordered set of games in normal form. We characterize strong rationalizability (resp., prudent rationalizability) in dynamic games with unawareness by iterated conditional strict (resp., weak) dominance in the associated generalized normal form. We also show that the analogue to iterated admissibility for dynamic games with unawareness depends on the extensive form. This is because, under unawareness, a player's information set not only determines which nodes she considers possible but also which game tree(s) she is aware of.

Keywords: Awareness; unknown unknowns; extensive form; normal form; strong rationalizabity; extensive-form rationalizability; prudent rationalizability; iterated conditional dominance; iterated admissibility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30
Date: 2026-04-29
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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