Epistemic foundations of game theory

Giacomo Bonanno ()

No 70, Working Papers from University of California, Davis, Department of Economics

Abstract: This is the first draft of a chapter for the forthcoming Handbook of Epistemic Logic, edited by Hans van Ditmarsch, Joe Halpern, Wiebe van der Hoek and Barteld Kooi (College Publications). Contents: 1. Introduction 2. Epistemic Models of Strategic-Form Games 3. Semantic Analysis of Common Belief of Rationality 4. Syntactic Characterization of Common Belief of Rationality 5. Common Belief versus Common Knowledge 6. Probabilistic Beliefs and von Neumann- Morgenstern Payoffs 7. Dynamic Games with Perfect Information 8. The Semantics of Belief Revision 9. Common Belief of Rationality in Perfect-Information Games 10. Literature Review

Keywords: Common belief; common knowledge; rationality; strategic-form game; dynamic game; belief revision (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37
Date: 2012-05-20
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Related works:
Working Paper: Epistemic foundations of game theory (2014)
Working Paper: Epistemic foundations of game theory (2014)
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