Reasoning about strategies and rational play in dynamic games

Giacomo Bonanno ()

No 9, Working Papers from University of California, Davis, Department of Economics

Abstract: We discuss a number of conceptual issues that arise in attempting to capture, in dynamic games, the notion that there is "common understanding" among the players that they are all rational.

Keywords: Belief revision; common belief; counterfactual; dynamic game; model of a game; rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37
Date: 2011-11-17
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Related works:
Working Paper: Reasoning about strategies and rational play in dynamic games (2014)
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