COALITIONAL POWER STRUCTURE IN STOCHASTIC SOCIAL CHOICE FUNCTIONS WITH AN UNRESTRICTED PREFERENCE DOMAIN

Shasikanta Nandeibam
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Shasikanta Nandeibam: Delhi School of Economics

No 12, Working papers from Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics

Abstract: When the individuals in Pattanaik and Peleg [16] are permitted to have weak preference orders, we show that: (I) as in their paper, theft) is a unique weight for each coalition; and (ii) for each feasible proper subset of the universal set and each preference profile, UH.~ society call be partitioned, so that, the weight of each coalition in this partition gives the probability of choosing some alternative which is best in tile feasible set for at least one individual in the coalition. When the universal set is the feasible set, our result still hold provided certain additional condition are satisfied. Journal of Economic literature' Classification Number: D71

Pages: 25 pages
Date: 1994-06
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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