BARGAINING WITH SET-VALUED DISAGREEMENT

Kaushik Basu

No 14, Working papers from Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics

Abstract: It is arguable that in many two-person bargaining situations disagreement leads to a set of possible payoffs with no probabilities attached to the elements of the set. Axioms are developed for bargaining games of this kind and solution concepts are derived from these axioms. Particular attention is paid to what are here called the 'max-max' and 'rectangular general' solutions. The latter can be applied to an important sub-class of bargaining games where the disagreement set is equal to the feasible set.

Pages: 29 pages
Date: 1994-07
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cdedse.org/pdf/work14.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Bargaining with set-valued disagreement (1996)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cde:cdewps:14

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cdedse.org/

The price is free.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working papers from Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics Delhi 110 007. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sanjeev Sharma ().