On R&D Information Sharing and Merger

Uday Sinha

No 145, Working papers from Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics

Abstract: The paper deals with the issue of information sharing in a Cournot duopoly by an innovating firm in the face of a merger with its rival. The innovating firm would share information about the cost realization with its rival provided the market size is relatively small or, the R&D technology is relatively more efficient in a medium market size. However, in a large market, or in a medium market size with less efficient R&D technology, the innovating firm does not share information with its rival. We also show that the social welfare may be higher under incomplete information regime.

Keywords: Information sharing; market size; R&D; merger and welfare. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 O32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2006-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-ind, nep-ino, nep-knm and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: On R&D information sharing and merger (2013)
Working Paper: On R&D Information Sharing and Merger (2010)
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