Expert Captured Democracies

Archishman Chakraborty, Parikshit Ghosh and Jaideep Roy
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Archishman Chakraborty: Syms School of Business, Yeshiva University

No 299, Working papers from Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics

Abstract: Does public cheap talk by a biased expert benefitt voters? The answer depends on the nature of democratic institutions and the extent of communication possibilities. Expert endorsements induce office-seeking parties to serve the expert’s interests, hurting voters. Expert advocacy makes policies respond to information, helping voters. Together, policy advocacy and partisan endorsements are often better than either alone. Their interaction creates a delegation benefit of indirect democracy. Voters may prefer this institution to one where policymaking is geared to serving the public interest. Direct expert capture of one party is another form of delegation and the best institution for voters.

Keywords: experts; endorsements; advocacy; electoral competition; indirect democracy; cheap talk; intermediation; delegation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 52 pages
Date: 2019-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Expert-Captured Democracies (2020)
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