Strategyproof and Budget Balanced Mechanisms for Assembly

Soumendu Sarkar

No 320, Working papers from Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics

Abstract: Assembly is an exchange problem with one buyer and multiple sellers. The buyer wants to purchase multiple items and sellers hold one item each. In applications like land acquisition, the buyer is required to purchase contiguous land plots to realize a project worth any value. This paper characterizes strategyproof,individually rational and budget balanced mechanisms for the assembly problem when the valuations of the agents are private information. It also examines several mechanisms in this class. JEL Codes: C78, D82

Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2022-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-ore
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