Meritocracy and Representation

Rajiv Sethi and Rohini Somanathan
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Rajiv Sethi: Department of Economics,Barnard College, Columbia University and the Santa Fe Institute

No 325, Working papers from Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics

Abstract: A standard conception of meritocracy, reflected in state referenda and the many legal filings against university admissions policies, is that selection rules should be blind to group identity and monotonic in measures of past accomplishment. We present theoretical arguments and survey empirical evidence challenging this view. Past accomplishment is often a garbled signal of multiple traits, some of which matter more for future performance than others. In such cases, group identity can be informative as a predictor of success and the increased representation of resource-disadvantaged groups could improve organizational performance. This perspective helps explain some recent empirical findings regarding the efficiency effects of group-contingent selection, and moves us towards a conception of meritocracy more closely tied to organizational mission.

Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2022-05
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Journal Article: Meritocracy and Representation (2023)
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