EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Corruption as a form of extreme individualism: An economic explanation based on geography and climate conditions

Michael Arghyrou

No E2010/8, Cardiff Economics Working Papers from Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section

Abstract: We present a simple model explaining corruption on geography and climate conditions. We test the model's validity in a cross-section of 115 countries. Controlling for all other corruption's determinants we find evidence supporting the model's predictions. Corruption increases with temperature and declines with precipitation and non-cultivatable land. Corruption also declines with per capita GDP, democracy, median age and British colonial heritage,and increases with natural resources, bureaucracy and communist past. Finally, corruption declines with the ratio of internet users to total population. This new finding is interpreted as capturing the beneficial interaction of economic development, human capital/education and independent news.

Keywords: individualism; fairness; corruption; geography and climate conditions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 2010-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://carbsecon.com/wp/E2010_8.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdf:wpaper:2010/8

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cardiff Economics Working Papers from Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Yongdeng Xu ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-30
Handle: RePEc:cdf:wpaper:2010/8