Same-Sex Marriage, The Great Equalizer

Alexei Parakhonyak and Sergey Popov

No E2019/2, Cardiff Economics Working Papers from Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section

Abstract: When limited to heterosexual marriage, agents of different genders are not guaranteed to harvest the same payoff even conditional on having the same type, even if all other factors, such as search costs or the distribution of partner types, are same across genders. If same-sex marriage is legalized and there is a positive mass of agents who find marriage with both sexes acceptable, then only symmetric equilibria survive in symmetric environments.

Keywords: Text Search; marriage markets, matching, gender equality, same-sex marriage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2019-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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