Unrewarded Cooperation

Arkady Konovalov, Daniil Luzyanin () and Sergey Popov
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Daniil Luzyanin: University of Birmingham

No E2025/10, Cardiff Economics Working Papers from Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section

Abstract: Experiment participants in a social dilemma game choose cooperation over defection, even though neither is more beneficial. High levels of cooperation cannot be explained by favorable labels for actions, collusion, k-level reasoning, quantal response behavior, or misplaced optimism about others' actions, but can be rationalized by the Charness and Rabin (2002) preference model. However, cooperation rates fall with changes in payoffs, which cannot be explained by the standard formulation; to account for these results, we introduce a generalization of the model.

Keywords: cooperation; coordination; social preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C9 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2025-03
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