Information Transmission Under Privacy Concerns

Qiaoxi Zhang, Helmuts Azacis and Indrajit Ray ()
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Qiaoxi Zhang: Institute of Economics, Corvinus University of Budapest, Budapest, Hungary

No E2025/20, Cardiff Economics Working Papers from Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section

Abstract: We analyse how privacy regulations affect information transmission when a platform observes a sensitive and a nonsensitive signal. If privacy is sufficiently important, restrictions that prohibit conditioning on the sensitive signal or require sufficient statistics can eliminate information transmission. When the platform must elicit the sensitive signal from a privacy-concerned sender, the optimal policy endogenously satisfies one or the other requirement depending on parameters.

Keywords: privacy; information design; mechanism design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 55 pages
Date: 2025-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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